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Abstract 
We examine a unique feature of the Australian Securities Exchange’s (ASX’s) mandatory 
quarterly reporting regulations for mining exploration companies. These regulations require 
the reporting of mining activities inclusive of a prescribed format quarterly cash flow report 
containing forecasted pre-production costs. Motivated by the absence of any prior research on 
mandatory cash expenditure forecasts, we investigate compliance, the reliability of the 
forecasts and firm-specific factors associated with forecast reliability. Our findings reveal a 
high level of compliance but significant inaccuracies (median forecast error of around 50 
percent of actual expenditure for exploration and evaluation expenditure and 85 percent for 
development expenditure), and some evidence of forecast bias. Forecast inaccuracy is more 
prevalent in firms that have poorer performance, greater financial slack, greater cash-flow 
volatility, no financial leverage, and in firms that are smaller, in the pre-development stage, 
and in the mineral (non-oil and gas) sub-industry. Our findings question the usefulness of 
mandatory forecasting by showing that the information role of forecasts in capital markets is 
impaired when firms have little discretion over the forecast decision, timing and specificity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Our study examines the usefulness of forecasted pre-production costs in the quarterly cash 
flow reports of Australian mining exploration companies, and their relation to firm-specific 
characteristics. Three related issues motivate our study. First, numerous corporate scandals 
have focused regulators’ attention around the world on strengthening corporate governance 
and disclosure regulations (Coglianese, Healey, Keating, and Michael, 2004). Sound financial 
disclosures mitigate agency problems by reducing information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders. However, where financial disclosures are poor, the opposite 
can occur; information asymmetry may increase, some market participants may be misled, 
and the firm’s cost of equity and shareholder wealth may be adversely affected (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). A higher probability of poorer quality disclosure is likely to be observed in 
situations where regulations prescribe the disclosure of forward-looking information by 
companies operating in uncertain environments.   
Second, the mining industry plays a significant role in the Australian economy, 
representing approximately 20 percent of market capitalisation and about one third of all 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed companies (ASX, 2008). The mining industry is 
characterised by high operating risk and information asymmetry, leading to high price 
volatility. In this environment, public disclosure regarding outcomes from exploration and 
production activities can have a significant impact on stock prices. Since mid-2005, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has increased its surveillance of 
small mining company disclosures (ASIC, 2006). This increased surveillance followed 
concerns about inadequate disclosures in 2005 and 2006 and claims that surveillance efforts 
by the ASX were inadequate due to the lack of resources and expertise for monitoring mining 
company disclosures. [1] 
Third, the ASX requires listed mining exploration companies to issue quarterly cash 
flow reports in accordance with Listing Rule (LR) 5.3 and Appendix 5B. A unique additional 
disclosure in these reports is a requirement to forecast future cash outflows relating to pre-
production expenditure. The release of forward-looking information has the potential to 
expand the information set available to investors and its disclosure may be viewed as one 
dimension of financial reporting quality since a financial report containing such information 
is more likely to be perceived as being of higher quality (Ajinkya, Bhorjraj, and Sengupta, 
2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). However, the uncertain operating environment of 
mining exploration companies raises the issue of forecast reliability. Scott (2003) contends, 
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that to highlight the uncertain nature and improve the reliability of forward-looking 
information, companies should only forecast for the period that such information can be 
reasonably estimated and in doing so, disclose underlying forecast assumptions. [2]   However, 
despite this common view on when and how forecasts should be provided, the LR 5.3 does 
not permit any forecasting discretion and does not require disclosure of assumptions by 
mining explorers in their Appendix 5B cash flow reports. [3]  
Given the unusual nature of cash expenditure forecasts and the fact that they have 
been required for more than a decade, it could be expected that some research would have 
been conducted on the usefulness of such forecasts, however, we are unable to identify any 
prior research on this issue.  The absence of research provides an opportunity to extend the 
disclosure literature to mandatory cash expenditure forecasts. Three research questions are 
considered: (1) What is the nature of the Appendix 5B cash flow forecasts? (2) How accurate 
are the forecasts, and are they biased? (3) What firm-specific characteristics influence the 
accuracy and bias of the forecasts? The characteristics examined include performance, 
financial slack, cash flow volatility, leverage, size (as measured by total assets), age and 
experience, and sub-industry (minerals versus and oil and gas).  
Our findings show that most mining exploration entities comply with the requirement 
to disclose forecasts. Nearly 90 percent of entities provide evaluation and exploration 
expenditure forecasts and nearly 20 percent of these same firms also provide development 
expenditure forecasts. However, despite the high level of compliance, our results reveal 
significant inaccuracies and some bias in the forecasts. On both a quarterly and pooled basis, 
the median forecast error is approximately 50 percent of the actual expenditure for 
exploration and evaluation expenditure, and approximately 85 percent of the actual 
expenditure for development expenditure. Our findings reveal that forecast inaccuracy is 
more prevalent in firms that have poorer performance, greater financial slack, greater cash-
flow volatility, no financial leverage, and in firms that are smaller, in the pre-development 
stage, and in the mineral (non-oil and gas) sub-industry. We also find evidence that some of 
the same factors influence forecast bias. The significant inaccuracies and considerable 
variation across firms challenge the wisdom of mandating such forward-looking information 
for these type of entities.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the ASX listing rule as well as extant literature on financial forecasting by managers. 
Section 3 provides an overview of related research. Section 4 outlines the research questions 
and expectations. Section 5 presents the sample selection and research design. Section 6 
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presents the summary statistics and main results of the study. Section 7 summarises and 
discusses the implications of the study.   
 
2. Institutional Background and Quarterly Reporting Requirements 
Disclosures relating to exploration and development activities are governed by the 
Australasian Code for Reporting of Mineral Resources and Ore Reserves (JORC Code). [4] 
This code was developed to ensure that mining and exploration companies report all 
information necessary for stakeholders to evaluate the activities of the company (ASX, 2008). 
The ASX requires listed mining exploration companies to issue quarterly activity and cash 
flow reports in accordance with ASX Listing Rule 5.3 and Appendix 5A and 5B (the JORC 
Code). With the exception of commitments test entities, [5] mining exploration companies are 
the only companies in Australia required to provide quarterly reports in addition to their 
annual reporting requirements (Gallery, Gallery and Sidhu, 2004). In most jurisdictions 
outside North America, annual and semi-annual reports have been the traditional means for 
conveying detailed financial and non-financial information to stakeholders.   
 
2.1 ASX Listing Rule 5.3  
On 1 July 1996, the ASX amended LR 5.3 to require all listed mining exploration entities to 
issue quarterly cash flow reports, known as Appendix 5B reports. The purpose of this change 
was to inform the market on “how the entity’s activities have been financed for the past 
quarter and the effect on its cash position” (ASX, 2001). The cash flow report must be lodged 
as soon as the information is available or within one month after the end of each quarter of its 
financial year (ASX, 2001). A director or company secretary must complete a compliance 
statement attesting to the fact that the information contained in the 5B report has been 
prepared under accounting policies that comply with accounting standards, as defined in the 
Corporations Act 2001 or other standards acceptable to the ASX, and provides a true and fair 
view of the matters disclosed. However, unlike annual and semi-annual cash flow statements, 
there is no requirement for the 5B report to be audited or reviewed by an external auditor. 
The format of the cash flow report is specified in Appendix 5B, which contains a proforma 
cash flow statement, some additional financial information, and limited note disclosures. This 
format has been modelled on accounting standard AASB 107 Cash Flow Statements [6], 
which guides the presentation and preparation of annual cash flow statements by reporting 
entities in Australia. One stated benefit of a cash flow statement is to inform investors of the 
“amount, timing, and certainty of future cash flows” (AASB107, para. 5).  
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Although modelled on AASB 107, the prescribed content of Appendix 5B cash flow 
statements contain a number of notable variations from the AASB 107 version. First, while 
the Appendix 5B cash flow statement contains the general categories of cash flows (cash 
flows from operating, investing and financing), the line items within these categories are 
more detailed and suited to mining companies. For example, individual line item disclosures 
are required for cash outflows for exploration and evaluation, development, production, and 
administration activities. Second, other supplementary information that is not required under 
AASB 107 must be reported, including details of related party transactions, securities, and 
non-cash financing activities, and for the next quarter, the estimated cash outflows relating to 
exploration and evaluation activities (Item 4.1) and development activities (Item 4.2). Also, 
an entity wanting to disclose additional information is encouraged to do so, in a note or notes 
attached to the report (Appendix 5B, Note 1). [7]  
Interestingly, cash expenditure forecasts are not required to be disclosed under 
Australia’s GAAP or other corporate regulations. Although the ASX does not provide a 
rationale for their listing rule requirement, it is presumed that the speculative nature of the 
industry calls for greater disclosure in the form of financial forecasts to better inform 
investors of the amount, timing, and certainty of future cash flows.  
 
2.2 Accounting for Exploration and Evaluation Costs 
In Australia, exploration and evaluation costs are accounted for in accordance with AASB 6 
Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources[8]. Unsurprisingly, most mining 
exploration companies exercise their discretion permitted under this standard (AASB 6, para. 
Aus 7.1) and capitalise rather than immediately expense exploration and evaluation costs 
costs. Hence, these costs are treated as assets in the balance sheet rather than expenses in the 
income statement, which is unlike other costs of a similar nature, such as research and 
development expenditure generated in the research phase. [9] 
The accounting treatment of pre-production costs may provide managers with 
incentives to focus their spending on exploration, evaluation and development costs, rather 
than other costs. Lilien and Pastena (1982) contend that firms that incur large amounts of pre-
production costs have a greater incentive to capitalise these costs than expense them in order 
to avoid significant negative impacts on their income statement and balance sheet. Hence, 
from a financial statement perspective, when forecasting pre-production costs, managers have 
no strong incentive to understate their forecasts.  
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3. Related Research 
Prior research on financial forecasting by managers largely examines voluntary earnings 
forecast incentives (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Only a few studies have examined management 
cash forecasts. For example, Wasley and Wu (2006) investigate managers’ incentives in the 
United States (U.S.) to provide voluntary cash flow forecasts. In a study of 2090 forecasts 
appearing in press releases from mid-1979 to October 2003, they report that management 
issue cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flows and thus, mitigate the negative 
impact of bad news in earnings, lend credibility to good news in earnings, and signal 
economic viability for young firms. They also find that cash flow forecasts are important in 
meeting investor demand for this type of information. Unlike prior studies on voluntary 
earnings forecasts, which reveal that managers tend to disclose bad news, especially when the 
risks of litigation are high (Skinner, 1994; Skinner, 1997; Francis, Philbrick and Schipper, 
1994) and job security is threatened (Brennan, 1999; Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988; 
Weisbach, 1988), Wasley and Wu conclude that different incentives, other than litigation 
risk, drive the disclosure of different types of financial information, including cash flow 
information.  
There is no known research on mandatory cash flow forecasts; however, there are 
some studies on mandatory sales and earnings forecasts. For example, Kato, Skinner and 
Kunimura (2006) investigate the accuracy of annual sales and earnings forecasts (as single-
point estimates) issued under the Japanese Stock Exchange Timely Disclosure Rules 
(Kessan-Tannsin). In accordance with these rules (as prescribed in the Stock Exchange Act) 
listed entities must provide ‘significant’ [10] forecast revisions at interim announcement dates. 
Based on a sample of 35,639 management forecasts issued from 1997 to 2006, their results 
reveal that managers initially set overly optimistic forecasts at the beginning of the year 
(especially for firms with poor profitability), and then issue downwards forecast revisions to 
meet realisations.  
Kato et al.’s (2000) findings indicate that management forecasts are consistently 
biased from one year to the next, possibly because (1) managers are not exposed to the same 
high levels of litigation risk as managers in other countries, such as the U.S. and (2) 
reputation costs are not sufficient to penalise managerial opportunism in forecasting. Kato et 
al. conclude that despite their consistent optimism, management forecasts in Japan affect 
stock prices (albeit these effects are smaller than those observed in the U.S.) and are 
informative about future earnings. [11]  
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In addition to the institutional differences, the relevance of the prior forecast research 
to our study is limited by the reporting period (i.e. annual cash flows as opposed to quarterly 
cash flows), type of forecasts required (i.e. net cash flows versus cash outflows), and/or by 
the regulatory regime (i.e., voluntary versus mandatory forecasts). Nevertheless, the findings 
are important to this study because they show that, unlike prior earnings forecast findings, the 
disclosure of cash flow information is potentially motivated by different incentives.  
 
4. Research Questions and Expectations 
4.1 Compliance 
Our first research question is: what is the nature of the Appendix 5B cash flow forecasts? 
Given that these forecasts are mandatory, we focus on the compliance issue in addressing this 
question. It is well accepted that routine compliance with disclosure regulations requires 
implementation of effective enforcement mechanisms (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and 
Shleifer, 2006). The ASX has implemented a market surveillance unit that monitors company 
compliance with listing rules and provides suspension and expulsion measures for non-
compliance. Nevertheless, a comprehensive investigation of the ASX website, company 
queries, and disciplinary activities from 2001 to 2006 found no evidence of ASX action with 
respect to incomplete or inaccurate information in 5B cash flow reports. This lack of 
enforcement suggests that the forecasting decision and the quality of forecasts ultimately 
depend upon managerial discretion.[12] Thus we expect non-compliance is likely to be 
prevalent under these circumstances. 
 
4.2 Forecasting Accuracy and Bias 
Our second research question is: how accurate are the forecasts, and are they biased? In 
examining the factors associated with forecast accuracy, most prior studies associate the 
frequency and quality of earnings forecasts with attempts to minimise litigation costs. For 
example,  Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough (2002) show that bad-news firms are more 
inclined to provide forecasts when the risks of litigation are relatively high. Bamber and 
Cheon (1998) find that managers are less inclined to issue specific earnings forecasts when 
exposure to legal liability and proprietary information costs are high. Similarly, Skinner 
(1994) documents that to minimise litigation costs, good earnings-related news tends to be 
disclosed as point or range estimates while bad news disclosures tend to be disclosed in 
qualitative statements and related to quarterly earnings announcements.  
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Reputation costs and credibility concerns are also important considerations in 
encouraging accuracy and deterring managers from issuing biased forecasts (Skinner, 1994; 
Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2000; Hong and Kubik, 2003; Rogers and Stocken, 2005 ). If 
managers obtain a reputation for unreliable forecasts, the credibility of their forecasts will 
decline, making it less likely that stock prices will respond positively to their forecasts and 
harder to convince investors of their managerial ability (Hutton and Stocken, 2006; 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Over 90 percent of U.S. managers surveyed by Graham, 
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) agreed or strongly agreed that voluntarily disclosures promote a 
reputation for transparent reporting (see also La Porta et al., 2006). The findings of Kato et 
al. (2006) with respect to mandatory management earnings forecasts in Japan, and Gallery et 
al. (2008) with respect to voluntary management earnings forecasts in Australian initial 
public offer prospectuses, provide some support for the influence of reputation in lower 
litigation environments. Both studies show that managers attempt to walk down prior 
earnings forecasts through forecast revisions prior to the earnings realisation dates.  
In the case of mining exploration companies, cash expenditure forecasts in 5B reports 
are issued in point form. These specific forecasts encompass a narrower range of outcomes, 
which increases the likelihood of inaccuracy. The lack of enforcement and the associated low 
litigation risk reduces incentives for managers to devote resources to providing better quality 
forecasts. While forecasts are expected to be inaccurate, it is not clear what incentives 
managers have to bias their cash expenditure forecasts other than to meet budgeted 
expenditure outlays. Also, unlike the Japanese stock exchange and Australian IPO forecasts, 
the ASX does not require or explicitly encourage mining explorers to issue forecast revisions 
prior to reporting the actual realised outflows in the subsequent 5B report. Hence, managers 
have little opportunity to correct biases in cash expenditure forecasts. Therefore, apart from a 
desire to meet targets or budgets, we do not expect exploration firms to exhibit optimistic 
biases in their expenditure forecasts.  
 
4.3 Forecast Accuracy and Firm-Characteristics  
Our third research question is:  what firm-specific characteristics influence the accuracy and 
bias of the forecasts? In examining this question we consider relevant factors from prior 
disclosure research, namely: performance, financial slack, financial leverage, cash flow 
volatility, firm age and experience, size, and sub-industry membership. [13]  
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(a) Performance 
Disclosure research generally shows that better performing firms produce more frequent and 
better quality forecasts. Early U.S. research reveals that management earnings forecasts tend 
to be more frequent when firm performance is high rather than low (Penman, 1980; 
Verrecchia, 1983; Lev and Penman, 1990, Lang and Lundholm, 1993). However, in more 
recent times, concerns about increased litigation risk in the U.S. show that management 
forecasts have shifted from being more frequently associated with good performers (a ‘good 
news’ firm bias) to more frequently associated with poorer performers (a ‘bad news’ firm 
bias) (Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995).  Outside the U.S. where litigation risk is 
lower, the good news bias tends to persist (Baginski et al., 2002), and there is some evidence 
that better performing firms tend to produce more accurate and less optimistically biased 
forecasts (Kato et al., 2006). For similar reasons we expect that better performing mining 
explorers will produce cash expenditure forecasts with similar properties. Also, in the case of 
these firms, a high cash burn rate contributes to an ongoing need for future funding. The more 
a firm can generate cash from internal sources, the less uncertainty associated with future 
cash flows. Hence we expect that better performing firms (as measured by cash performance) 
are more likely to have more accurate expenditure forecasts. 
 
(b) Financial Slack 
Sufficient cash holdings are necessary for firms to fund working capital requirements and 
investments in positive NPV projects. Observable differences in cash holdings across firms 
are a natural outcome of differences in the cost of external financing, capital constraints, and 
the level of financial distress (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Almeida, Campello, 
and Weisbach, 2004). However, high cash balances can induce managers to overinvest in 
negative NPV projects, which benefit managers at the expense of shareholders (Easterbrook, 
1984; Jensen, 1986). Furthermore, managers can more readily consume liquid assets for 
private gain than fixed assets (Myers and Rajan, 1998). This inefficiency in cash expenditure, 
or agency view, is generally consistent with the empirical evidence (see Blanchard, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1994; Harford, 1999, ; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 
1999). However, the evidence is not conclusive on the optimal level of cash holdings or the 
impact of alternative governance characteristics and disclosure on the level of firms’ cash 
holdings (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007).   
In addition to the agency concerns of excessive cash holdings, mining exploration 
companies face difficulty in quickly raising external funds due to their size and uncertain 
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operating environments. Therefore the failure to meet budgets and estimates may be related 
to a combination of agency and non-agency related factors such as poor planning and cost 
control. The agency and non-agency arguments both lead to similar predictions. Where cash 
holdings are large, managers are more likely to waste cash on less productive activities (i.e. 
non-exploration or development activities, such as administration and inefficient related-party 
transactions). In these circumstances, managers are likely to produce more inaccurate 
forecasts. In contrast, in companies with low levels of cash holdings, managers are more 
likely to be focused on allocating cash to productive activities and conserving cash resources.  
Hence, it is expected that where financial slack is low, managers will issue more accurate 
expenditure forecasts.   
 
(c) Financial Leverage 
As leverage increases, lenders demand more information to ensure effective monitoring of 
the firm in order to assess the probability of a firm meeting its debt obligations (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). However, empirical studies present mixed findings with respect to the 
association between leverage variables and more frequent and better quality disclosure. Some 
researchers document a positive association between leverage and the voluntary disclosure of 
information (Ferguson, Lam, and Lee, 2002; Bradbury, 1992), while others fail to find any 
significant association (Malone, Fries, and Jones, 1993; Wallace, Naser, and Mora, 1994). 
Contrary to these studies, Meek, Roberts, and Gray (1995) report a significant, negative 
relationship for U.S., United Kingdom (U.K.), and continental European multinational 
corporations when disclosure is voluntary. A major assumption is that leverage variables 
(typically the debt-to-equity or debt-to-asset ratio) accurately proxy for the underlying 
financial risk across sample companies regardless of other cross-sectional differences such as 
firm size, asset structure, operating risk, and industry. In the case of mining exploration 
companies only a minority (approximately one third) have any form of debt in their capital 
structure. Explorers that have secured debt funding typically have a higher portion of assets 
in place, face lower uncertainty about their prospects, and have agreed to debtholder 
monitoring.  Thus, firms with financial leverage are likely to produce more accurate cash 
expenditure forecasts than firms without financial leverage.  
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(d) Cash Flow Volatility 
Where investors demand information about cash flows, managers have incentives to issue 
cash flow forecasts (Wasley and Wu, 2006). However, where the firm’s cash flows are more 
volatile, it can be more difficult for managers to make accurate forecasts (Wasley and Wu). 
Prior earnings forecast literature contends that when earnings are highly volatile, managers 
face a greater risk of making an inaccurate forecast (Baginski et al., 2002; Kato et al., 2006). 
In the case of cash flows, they can be more volatile than earnings because of the smoothing 
effect of accruals in earnings and because managers can engage in earnings management to 
reduce earnings volatility (Wasley and Wu).  In the case of mining exploration companies, 
they operate in an uncertain environment that contributes to less predictable and more volatile 
cash flows than many other entities. It is therefore expected that as cash flow volatility 
increases, explorers produce less accurate cash expenditure forecasts.  
  
(e) Firm Age and Experience  
Prior studies provide mixed results on the relationship between disclosure and firm age. 
Image and reputation are both important considerations for older, well-established 
companies, and accordingly, they have been found to disclose more information than younger 
companies (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). However, Chen, DeFond, and Park (2002) find a negative 
association between disclosure and firm age under a quarterly earnings announcement 
regime. They argue that investors demand more useful information from younger firms 
because their earnings and production activities are more uncertain. Consistent with this 
argument, Wasley and Wu (2006) reveal that younger firms issue cash flow information to 
signal economic viability and therefore assist with raising external capital. However, younger 
explorers in the Australian market may not be able to provide sufficiently accurate cash 
forecasts to credibly signal to potential fund providers. Also, age may not successfully 
capture an explorer’s ability to predict future cash outlays if the firm has been unsuccessful in 
explorations activities over a number of years. A more relevant measure is likely to be a 
firm’s stage of operation. If a firm has progressed to the development stage it is more likely 
to be able to predict future cash exploration and evaluation expenditure than firms at the 
exploration stage. We therefore expect that both age and experience are likely to lead to more 
accurate forecasts.  
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(f) Size 
Firm size is likely to be closely related to age and experience and also capture other cross-
sectional differences in firms. Prior research finds that larger firms are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts compared to smaller firms (Cox, 1987; Choon, Smith, 
and Taylor, 2000). In the IPO setting, firm size is also argued to have a negative relationship 
with forecast error as larger firms have a greater capacity to absorb the impact of unexpected 
events, more diverse operations, and more sophisticated forecasting techniques (Chapple, 
Clarkson, and Peters, 2005; Hartnett and Romcke, 2000). In terms of mandated information, 
empirical evidence suggests that larger companies disclose more adequate information, as 
opposed to smaller companies because their competitive advantage is less likely to be 
threatened (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). [14] Therefore, it is expected that larger mining exploration 
firms are more likely to provide accurate forecasts than their smaller counterparts.  
 
(g) Sub-Industry Category 
Several studies in the disclosure literature have indicated that industry membership can 
influence a firm’s disclosure practices (Hope, 2003; Dye and Sridhar, 1995). For example, 
firms in high risk industries may disclose more information in order to better distinguish 
themselves from competitors in the same industry. With regard to cash flow forecasts, the 
accuracy of the forecast is likely to differ across industries. In the Australian mining industry, 
there are two major sub-industries: minerals (materials) and oil and gas (energy). The mineral 
explorers typically face greater uncertainty in their exploration activities because of the more 
diverse nature of their operations. However, oil and gas firms face greater difficulty in 
estimating and extracting hydrocarbon reserves relative to resources measurement and 
extraction in the minerals industry (see Sykes, 2001). In responding to the uncertainty facing 
oil and gas firms, the ASX imposes additional disclosure obligations on these firms. [15] Due 
to these differences, it is expected that oil and gas explorers will provide less accurate cash 
expenditure forecasts relative to the mineral explorers.  
 
5. Data and Research Design 
5.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources  
The sample comprises all mining explorations companies listed on the ASX that lodged 
Appendix 5B reports between 30 September 2005 and 31 July 2006. For most companies, the 
study period spans four consecutive quarterly reporting periods, which varies depending on 
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the company’s respective balance date. A total of 481 companies are identified as 
representing the entire population of companies subject to Appendix 5B quarterly cash flow 
reporting by the ASX. Within this population of firms, 371 firms are in the GICS material 
(minerals) sector (GICS Codes 15101010-15105020) and 110 are in the energy sector (oil 
and gas) sector (GICS Codes 10101010-10102050). Where an entity is not listed or has not 
provided a forecast for a certain quarter, the quarterly observation is excluded from testing 
procedures, yielding a total of 1760 cash flow reports (1377 for the Materials and 383 for 
Energy firms).  
All quarterly cash flow information (including lodgement dates, listing/de-listing 
date) was hand-collected from announcements (including Appendix 5Bs reports) and other 
information obtained through the Aspect Huntley DatAnalysis database. Company financial 
data from the annual financial reports were hand-collected from a combination of the 
Connect 4 Annual Reports Collection and Aspect Huntley FinAnalysis databases.  
 
5.2 Research Design 
Our research design uses summary statistics to examine research question one (compliance) 
and research question two (accuracy and bias). Multivariate regression procedures are used to 
examine research question three (factors associated with accuracy and bias).  The following 
sub-section explains the procedures used to measure the variables and test expected 
associations.  
 
Measuring Forecasting Accuracy and Bias 
Following prior research, accuracy or forecast error (FERROR) is measured as the absolute 
value of the signed cash expenditure forecast error deflated by the actual (realised) cash 
expenditure. [16]  
 
|Forecasted Cash expenditure – Actual Cash Expenditure|  
Actual Cash Expenditure 
 
This measure captures the magnitude of the cash flow forecast error and is useful in 
measuring the percentage error. However, the measure does not capture the economic 
significance of the error. Following prior research (e.g. Kato et al., 2006) we therefore use an 
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alternative metric (using total assets as a deflator) in regression analysis to capture the 
economic significance of the error, calculated as follows:  
 
|Forecasted Cash expenditure – Actual Cash Expenditure|  
Total Assets t-1 
 
Forecast bias (FBIAS) is the relative (unsigned) directional forecast error. As cash 
expenditure is treated as an outflow (a negative value), a positive forecast error (i.e. the actual 
exceeds the forecast) indicates an underestimation or conservative forecast, and a negative 
forecast error (i.e. the forecast exceeds the actual) indicates an overestimation or optimistic 
forecast. If managers issue cash expenditure forecasts based on true expectations and these 
expectations are unbiased, it is expected that on average, forecast error will be statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. 
 
Research Model  
Mining exploration companies are required to forecast cash outflows for exploration and 
evaluation costs, as well as development costs. Hence, the model below will be used to test 
research question three where the dependent variable is either forecast accuracy or bias for 
exploration and evaluation expenditure (equation 1) or development expenditure (equation 2). 
The (equation 1) or bias (equation 2) for exploration and evaluation costs, or development 
costs, and the independent variables are the previously explained firm-specific factors that are 
expected to explain error and bias.  
 
Exploration and Evaluation Expenditure Model: 
ititititititit AGELEVDUMCFVOLFINSLACKPERFORMFBIASorFERROR 654321 αααααα +++++=
          ititit INDDUMSIZEAGEEXP εααα ++++ 987      (1) 
 
Development Expenditure Model:      
ititititititit AGELEVDUMCFVOLFINSLACKPERFORMFBIASorFERROR 654321 ββββββ +++++=
          ititit INDDUMSIZE εββ +++ 87       (2) 
 
++++++= itititititit AGELEVDUMCFVOLFINSLACKPERFORMFERROR 654321 αααααα
         ititit INDDUMSIZEAGEEXP εααα +++ 987      (1) 
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++++++= itititititit AGELEVDUMCFVOLFINSLACKPERFORMFBIAS 654321 ββββββ          
ititit INDDUMSIZE εββ ++ 87         (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
Dependent Variables 
FERROR   = |Forecasted cash expenditure – actual cash expenditure| deflated by lagged 
total assets; and 
FBIAS  = Forecasted cash expenditure – actual cash expenditure deflated by lagged total 
assets (signed values). 
Independent Variables 
PERFORM  = Net operating cash flows deflated by average total assets;  
FINSLACK  = Total cash at the end of the current quarter deflated by average total assets; 
CFVOL  = Standard deviation of net operating cash flows over four prior quarters 
deflated by lagged total assets;  
LEVDUM  = One if the company has financial leverage (interest-bearing debt) and zero 
otherwise;  
AGE  = Number of years between the listing and the current quarterly reporting date; 
AGEEXP   = One if the company has both actual exploration/evaluation and development 
expenditure in the same quarter, and zero otherwise; 
SIZE  = Natural logarithm of average total assets for the current fiscal year (t) and 
prior year (t-1); and 
INDDUM = One if the company is in the energy sector and zero if the company is in the 
materials sector. 
 
6. Results  
6.1 Descriptive Statistics  
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Table 1 reports the number of cash expenditure reports and forecasts issued for exploration 
and evaluation (EE) costs (Panel A) and developments costs (Panel B) over each of the four 
quarters and an average for all quarters. Of the 481 firms in the sample (371 for materials and 
110 for energy) an average of 440 reports (344 for materials and 96 for energy) were lodged 
with the ASX over the study period.  Panel A and B further shows high compliance with the 
requirement to provide forecasts. For EE (development) forecasts, only 7.03 percent (6.21 
percent) on average fail to provide a forecast when there is actual expenditure recorded in the 
subsequent quarter. Although most firms provide EE forecasts (93.81 percent for material 
firms and 91.06 percent for energy firms), only a minority have reached the development 
expenditure forecast stage (18.94 percent for material firms and 41.82 percent for energy 
firms). The difference between the two industries highlights the need to control for sub-
industry type. Overall, these results show that contrary to our expectation for research 
question one, there is a strong culture of compliance with the ASX’s Appendix 5B 
forecasting requirements.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for forecasting accuracy (error and bias) for 
exploration and evaluation (Panel A) and development expenditure (Panel B). In both panels 
statistics for error and bias deflated by (a) actual cash outflows and (b) by lagged total assets 
are reported. In Panel A, the mean (median) error for the pooled observations (ERROR 
Pooled) is 210.3 percent (46.8 percent), indicating that companies are issuing significantly 
inaccurate forecasts. More than half the sample issues forecasts with a median error of nearly 
50 percent. Similar results are reported across each of the four quarters. In contrast, the 
median EE forecast bias is only -2.9 percent, which indicates a small optimistic bias (i.e. 
forecast expenditure is greater than actual expenditure). The statistics for EE forecast error 
and bias calculated using the total asset deflator further show that the error is also 
economically significant. The mean (median) forecast error is 18.1 percent (15 percent) of 
total reported assets for the prior period. In contrast, the EE forecast bias is almost zero 
relative to total assets. Thus these results show that in answer to research question two, EE 
expenditure forecasts are significantly inaccurate but not materially biased.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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Appendix A provides an example of a typical sample company’s quarterly 
expenditure forecasts extracted from Appendix 5B reports for the March 2006 quarter (the 
first period after listing) to the June 2008 quarter. The forecasts are compared with 
subsequent actual reported expenditure to estimate the forecast error. Over almost all quarters 
the errors are material (from 6.3 percent to 327.4 percent) and are optimistically biased. An 
examination of notes provided in the covering letter attached to the Appendix 5Bs revealed 
that delays in obtaining exploration permits where frequently cited as reasons for the failure 
to commence exploration activities on a number of mining claims. However, forecasts were 
not explained or qualified and there was no indication provided as to why the forecasts were 
continually inaccurate and optimistically biased.  
Table 2 Panel B shows development expenditure forecast error consistent with those 
reported for the EE forecast error. The median forecast error for the pooled observations is 
85.6 percent. Contrary to the findings for the EE forecasts, a significant positive forecast bias 
is evident for most of the quarterly figures and the pooled observations (median error of 17.3 
percent). This suggests that managers may be conservative in under-estimating their 
development expenditure relative to realised cash outflows. However, when the economic 
significance is considered (Panel B), the error for the pooled observations remains material 
with a mean (median) of 23 percent (17.39 percent), but not the bias. 
Table 3 further explores error and bias by displaying the signed error over percentiles 
for the full sample and the industry sub-samples (material and energy). The statistics reveal 
that the negative EE forecast error and bias shown in Table 2 are evident in both sub-
industries, but it is more pronounced in the energy sector. Approximately 87 percent of firms 
in this sector have errors greater than positive or negative 50percent and the negative errors 
dominate (58.4 percent are greater than -50 percent of realiszed cash flows). Thus, as 
expected, firms in the energy sector are more likely to produce inaccurate forecasts that 
overestimate their actual expenditure (negatively biased forecasts).  In contrast, Panel B 
shows that similar biases are not evident for development expenditure forecasts.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the independent variables entering in the 
regression model. The data were obtained from the most recent annual report prior to the 
release of each quarterly report. The sample size for most of the variables is less than the total 
481 observations due to missing data for some of the variables. The statistics reveal that most 
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firms are small (median total assets of $7.029 million), are performing poorly with negative 
net cash flow from operations, have relatively large amounts of their assets in the form of 
cash (median FINSLACK is 37.4 percent of total assets), have higher cash flow volatility, and 
are relatively young (median AGE is 4.74 years).  Also, most firms have no debt (67.41 
percent of the sample), are yet to reach the development expenditure stage (83.65 percent of 
the sample),  and, and are in the material sub-industry (77.13 percent of the sample).  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
 
6.2. Multiple Regression Results 
Exploration and Evaluation Forecast Expenditure 
Table 5 presents the results from estimating the model for EE forecasting error (Panel A) and 
bias (Panel B). Results are reported for each quarter and for the pooled observations. [17]  
Consistent with the findings of prior studies (Penman, 1980; Verrecchia, 1983; Lev and 
Penman, 1990), the Panel A pooled results show that the performance (PERFORM) 
coefficient is negative (-0.344) and significant (p<0.01), indicating that better performing 
firms provide more accurate forecasts. The financial slack (FINSLACK) and cash flow 
volatility (CFVOL) coefficients are positive (0.041 and 0.020) and significant (p<0.01); 
indicating that firms with greater cash holdings and greater cash flow volatility are more 
likely to exhibit greater EE forecasting errors. While the firm age (AGE) coefficient is not 
significant, the experience dummy coefficient (AGEEXP) is negative (-0.039) and significant 
(p<0.01) indicating that companies with more experience, that is, they have reached the 
development stage, are more likely to produce more accurate EE forecasts. Similarly the 
financial leverage (LEVDUM) coefficient is negative (-0.016) and significant (p<0.05), which 
suggests that the presence of debtholders may help to mitigate forecast inaccuracy. Also, 
consistent with prior research, larger firms are more likely to issue more accurate forecasts 
than smaller firms (the SIZE coefficient = -0.012; p<0.05). Finally, the negative and 
significant industry dummy (INDDUM) coefficient (0.035; p<0.01) indicates that consistent 
with the results reported in Table 3, firms in the materials sub-industry are more likely to 
provide more accurate EE forecasts than those in the energy sector. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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Apart from company age, the findings for EE forecast accuracy provide strong 
support for the expected explanators of EE forecast error and in combination, the variables 
have significant explanatory power (adjusted R2 = 37.9 percent). Similar results are evident in 
the quarterly models.  
The results in Table 5, Panel B for EE forecast bias are modest in comparison with 
Panel A. Given the weak evidence of bias previously reported it is not surprising that the 
results for EE forecast bias reveal fewer significant coefficients and a lower model 
explanatory power (adjusted R2 = 8.30 percent in the pooled model).  Only the coefficients 
for firm performance (PERFORM), financial slack (FINSLACK), pre-production stage 
experience (AGEEXP) and size (SIZE) are significant.  These results nevertheless reveal that 
better performance, greater financial slack, and pre-production stage experience induce an 
optimistic (overestimation) EE forecast bias, while larger size induces a conservative 
(underestimation) bias.  
 
Development Forecast Expenditure  
Table 6 presents the results of estimating the model for Development forecasting error (Panel 
A) and bias (Panel B). Consistent with the results reported for EE forecast error, Panel A 
shows in the pooled results that better performing firms (PERFORM), those with greater 
financial slack (FINSLACK), and greater cash flow volatility (CFVOL) are more likely to 
issue inaccurate forecasts. The size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), industry (IND) and leverage 
(LEV) coefficients have no significant influence on the Development forecast error.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 Panel B shows that only the coefficients for performance (PERFORM) and financial 
slack (FINSLACK) are negative and significant. These results indicate that firms that are 
performing poorly and have lower cash holdings are more likely to overstate their 
Development forecasts than firms that are performing well and have greater cash holdings. 
While these results are consistent with the results reported for EE forecast bias, none of the 
other variables display significant coefficients. The weaker results in Table 6 are possibly 
explained by the smaller sample of firms that have reached the development stage in the pre-
production activities. Nevertheless, even with this smaller sample, the results show that 
forecast accuracy can be explained by well recognised firm specific differences. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion  
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This study investigates the reliability of cash expenditure forecasts issued by mining 
exploration companies. Prior research has examined voluntary cash flow reporting by 
managers (e.g. Wasley and Wu, 2006), and voluntary (e.g. Skinner, 1994) and mandatory 
(e.g. Kato et al., 2006) management earnings forecasts. However, as cash flow forecasts are 
not mandated in other jurisdictions, and as this issue has not been previously examined in 
Australia, this is the first known study to identify and examine such a mandatory setting. The 
context of the study is the Australian Stock Exchange’s Appendix 5B quarterly cash flow 
report regime. This setting is particularly interesting because the ASX’s mandatory regime 
imposed on mining exploration companies only requires cash expenditure forecasts, not 
comprehensive cash flow (net cash flow) forecasts.  
We investigate three research questions relating to the quality of these cash 
expenditure forecasts: (1) What is the nature of the Appendix 5B cash flow forecasts? (2) 
How accurate are the forecasts and are they biased? (3) What firm-specific characteristics 
influence the accuracy and bias of the forecasts? We examine these questions using the 
available Appendix 5B cash expenditure forecasts (1760 cash expenditure observations) 
provided by the population of mining exploration entities listed on the ASX between 30 
September 2005 and 31 July 2006.  
Our findings show that most mining exploration entities comply with the requirement 
to disclose forecasts with more than 90 percent of entities providing evaluation and 
exploration expenditure forecasts, and nearly 20 percent of these same firms provide 
development expenditure forecasts. In contrast, similar findings are not observed for forecast 
accuracy and bias. On both a quarterly and pooled basis, the median forecast error is 
approximately 50 percent of the actual expenditure for exploration and evaluation 
expenditure, and approximately 85 percent of the actual expenditure for development 
expenditure. These findings indicate that firms have considerable difficulty in forecasting 
one-quarter-ahead pre-production expenditure. Our findings reveal that forecast inaccuracy is 
more prevalent in firms that have poorer performance, greater financial slack, greater cash-
flow volatility, and no financial leverage. Also, forecasts are less accurate for firms that are 
smaller, in the pre-development stage, and in the mineral (non-oil and gas) sub-industry. We 
also find evidence that some of the same firm-specific factors influence forecast bias.  
Overall, our results clearly show that, on average, the mandatory cash expenditure 
forecasts required by the ASX are unreliable and, contrary to the objectives of cash flow 
reports (AASB 107, para. 5), do not appear to provide information to better inform investors 
of the “amount, timing, and certainty” of future cash flows.[18] As a consequence, these 
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forecasts may adversely affect the investment decisions of investors. The fact that many 
forecasts are significantly inaccurate, together with the considerable variation we observe 
across firms in the extractive industry, challenge the wisdom of mandating such forward-
looking information for firms in uncertain operating environments.  
Given their potential to mislead, we suggest that cash expenditure forecasts should not 
remain mandatory. Regardless of whether they continue to be mandated or are made 
voluntary, we suggest that firms be required to disclose information about the underlying 
estimates and assumptions used in deriving the forecasts. Such additional disclosures would 
be consistent with best practice observed in other contexts, such as in initial public offer 
prospectus documents. Additionally, the Australian Securities Exchange should require firms 
to provide explanations when forecasts vary materially from estimates. Finally, our study 
adds to the small body of literature that reveals the limitations of mandatory forecasting. As 
in other studies (e.g. Kato et al., 2006) our findings show that the information role of 
forecasts in capital markets is impaired when firms have little discretion over the decision to 
forecast and the characteristics of the forecast.  
 
                                                          
Notes: 
1 For example, in 2006 CuDeco Ltd. announced to the ASX a significant copper discovery, leading to its share 
price increasing from 29 cents to ten dollars in just eight weeks. Following an ASX investigation the discovery 
was subsequently shown to be overstated. The ASX was heavily criticised for its slow response (West and 
Andrusiak, 2006).  
2 The ASIC adopts a similar “reasonable grounds” position with respect to forecasts in prospectuses (see ASIC, 
PS 170).  
3 Additional disclosures can be provided in notes to the cash flow report.   
4 The Code is issued by the Joint Ore Reserves Committee of The Australasian Institute of Mining and 
Metallurgy, Australian Institute of Geoscientists and Minerals Council of Australia. 
5 Commitments Test Entities are those companies that are allowed to list on the ASX without a ‘binding 
contract’, provided they make commitments to spend their cash in accordance with their business objectives 
(Gallery, Gallery and Sidhu, 2004).   
6 AASB 107 is the equivalent of IAS 7 Cash Flow Statements issued by the International Accounting Standard 
Setting Board (IASB).  
7 Although entities frequent provide additional information in coversheets and notes, a careful scrutiny of a large 
sample of 5B reports failed to find any evidence of attempts to justify forecasts or to explain forecast errors.  
8 AASB 6 is the equivalent of IFRS 6 Explorations and Evaluations of Mineral Resources issued by the IASB. 
9 Under AASB 138 Intangible Assets all research costs must be expensed (para. 54) because in the research 
phase, companies cannot demonstrate that an asset exists that will generate probable future income benefits 
(para. 55). Similarly with mining exploration and evaluation costs, there is on average, a low probability that 
these costs will result in a recoverable reserve from which the company will generate economic benefits, yet the 
company can initially capitalise these costs. (Development expenditure is generally recognised in accordance 
with AASB 138.)  
10 ‘Significant’ revisions in management forecast estimates are defined as changes in estimated sales of 10 
percent or more and/or changes in estimated earnings of 30 percent or more. 
11 There is also evidence that mandatory and voluntary earnings forecasts in Australian IPO prospectuses are 
materially inaccurate, optimistically biased, and tend to be walked down prior to the earnings realisation date 
(see Gallery, Gallery and Linus, 2008).  
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12 Arguably the absence of regulatory monitoring and sanctions for non-compliance is tantamount to having 
voluntary or no regulation at all (Fung, Weil, Graham, and Fagotto, 2004; Lopez-De-Silanes, 2003). 
13 We also test these same factors in examining forecast bias but we make no directional predictions about their 
influence on bias.  
14 Disclosure is considered “adequate” if it is relevant to the needs of users, capable of fulfilling those needs, and 
timely.  
15 Oil and gas firms must provide a hydrocarbon report (inclusive of pre-hydrocarbon reserve stage details) as 
part of their quarterly Appendix 5B reports (ASX Listing Rule 5.9-5.17). 
16 Actual rather than forecast cash expenditure is used as a deflator because a number of firms forecast zero cash 
expenditure. Appendix A5 provides an example of how this forecast error is calculated. 
17 A panel data random effects regression procedure is used to estimate the pooled model. Robust standard 
errors are used in estimating the reported coefficients.  
18 It is possible that the forecasts may be at least partially informative in some contexts. To more 
comprehensively assess the usefulness of the forecasts would require a comparative approach using alternative 
predictive models (e.g. historical versus forecast cash flows) and an assessment of the value-relevance of the 
forecasts to investors. We leave this relative value-relevance issue to further research.    
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
Central Petroleum Limited (CTP) 
Forecast Errors Calculated from Appendix 5B Estimated Cash Expenditure Outflows:  
March 2006 to June 2008 
 
App. 5B 
Item Quarter ending: Mar-06 Jun-06 Sep-06 Dec-06 Mar-07 Jun-07 Sep-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08
 Estimated Expenditure (next quarter) $A’000  
4.1 Exploration & evaluation   -500 -650 -2,000 -2,500 -2,000 -2,000 -1,000 -4,000 -7,000 -6,500
4.2  Development   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  Total   -500 -650 -2,000 -2,500 -2,000 -2,000 -1,000 -4,000 -7,000 -6,500
 Actual Expenditure (Cash flows related to operating activities)
1.2(a) Exploration & evaluation    -117 -85 -287 -1,481 -597 -422 -712 -3,763 -2,335
1.2(b) Development    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.2(c) Production  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.2(d) Administration  -509 -360 -344 -424 -458 -894 -549 -963 -892
   -626 -445 -631 -1905 -1055 -1316 -1261 -4726 -3227
            
 Net Operating Cash Flows -270 -541 -367 -467 -1,818 -885 -1,129 -1,023 -4,565 -3,007
 Cash at end of quarter 9,601 8,373 7,943 7,467 5,332 5,232 14,378 13,271 8,635 15,413
            
1.23 
Aggregate amount of 
payments to related parties 
included in item 1.2  -54 -100 -188 -91 -141 -268 -187 -118 -118
 Calculated Forecast Error 
 
Exploration & evaluation  
Actual Error  -383 -565 -1,713 -1,019 -1,403 -1,578 -288 -237 -4,665
 Error (%)  327.4% 664.7% 596.9% 68.8% 235.0% 373.9% 40.4% 6.3% 199.8%
ERROR is a measure of cash expenditure forecast accuracy and is measured as the absolute value of forecasted cash outflows 
less actual reported cash outflows for the respective quarter deflated by the absolute value of the actual outflows 
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TABLE 1 
Number of Forecasts Issued by Quarter 
          
Panel A: Exploration and evaluation 
           
Quarter 
No. of cash flow reports 
lodged No. of cash flow forecasts issued  No forecast but actual expenditure  
 Materials Energy Materials % Energy % Materials % Energy % 
1 328 85 304 92.68 76 89.41 25 7.62 6 7.06 
2 342 92 322 94.15 84 91.30 26 7.60 6 6.52 
3 349 99 330 94.56 91 91.92 18 5.16 7 7.07 
4 358 107 336 93.85 98 91.59 20 5.59 8 7.48 
Average 344 96 323 93.81 87 91.06 22 6.49 7 7.03 
                 
Total 1377 383 1292  349  89  27  
Panel B: Development 
           
Quarter 
No. of cash flow reports 
lodged No. of cash flow forecasts issued  No forecast but actual expenditure  
 Materials Energy Materials % Energy % Materials % Energy % 
1 328 85 57 17.38 38 44.71 19 5.79 5 5.88 
2 342 92 64 18.71 43 46.74 15 4.39 5 5.43 
3 349 99 69 19.83 39 39.39 13 3.74 6 6.06 
4 358 107 71 19.83 39 36.45 10 2.79 8 7.48 
Average 344 96 65 18.94 40 41.82 14 4.18 6 6.21 
                 
Total 1377 383 261  159  57  24  
Notes: Forecasts are sourced from 1760 quarterly cash flow reports issued by 481 firms during the 2005/2006 fiscal year.  The percentage of cash flow forecasts 
issued for both materials and energy sub-industries are calculated as the number of cash flow forecasts issued respectively, divided by the number of cash flow 
reports lodged for the particular quarter or average; No forecast refers to the number of companies which do not provide forecasted outflows but have actual outflows 
in the following quarter; the percentage of forecasts issued for No forecast is measured as the number of companies which provide no forecast divided by the number 
of cash flow reports lodged for the respective sub-industry. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics – Error and Bias 
 
Panel A: Exploration and Evaluation Expenditure 
Forecast Error deflated by actual expenditure  Forecast Bias deflated by actual expenditure 
Variable n Mean Median SD Variable Mean Median SD 
       
ERROR Q1 351 1.102 0.471 2.584 BIAS Q1 -0.652 0.032 2.733 
ERROR Q2 378 3.769 0.411 46.862 BIAS Q2 -3.349 0.041 46.894 
ERROR Q3 397 1.423 0.532 3.544 BIAS Q3 -1.024 -0.129 3.680 
ERROR Q4 405 2.081 0.462 10.460 BIAS Q4 -1.708 -0.086 10.528 
ERROR Pooled 1531 2.103 0.468 23.997 BIAS Pooled -1.694 -0.029 24.029 
       
Forecast Error deflated by Lagged Total Assets Forecast Bias deflated by Lagged Total Assets 
ERROR Q1 369 0.165 0.140 0.109 BIAS Q1 0.002 0.000 0.063 
ERROR Q2 391 0.173 0.147 0.129 BIAS Q2 0.006 0.000 0.083 
ERROR Q3 417 0.188 0.154 0.140 BIAS Q3 -0.009 -0.005 0.093 
ERROR Q4 422 0.196 0.159 0.148 BIAS Q4 -0.005 -0.004 0.099 
ERROR Pooled 1599 0.181 0.150 0.133 BIAS Pooled -0.002 -0.002 0.086 
Panel B: Development Expenditure 
Forecast Error deflated by actual expenditure  Forecast Bias deflated by actual expenditure 
Variable n Mean Median SD Variable Mean Median SD 
       
ERROR Q1 79 13.587 0.873 105.954 BIAS Q1 -12.725 0.296 106.062 
ERROR Q2 86 19.814 0.787 161.526 BIAS Q2 -19.009 0.257 161.624 
ERROR Q3 90 2.284 0.858 6.485 BIAS Q3 -1.584 -0.021 6.693 
ERROR Q4 87 2.818 0.864 8.861 BIAS Q4 -2.116 0.116 9.057 
ERROR Pooled 342 9.439 0.856 95.697 BIAS Pooled -8.674 0.173 95.770 
       
Forecast Error deflated by Lagged Total Assets Forecast Bias deflated by Lagged Total Assets 
ERROR Q1 109 0.188 0.152 0.174 BIAS Q1 -0.018 -0.002 0.110 
ERROR Q2 110 0.217 0.172 0.180 BIAS Q2 -0.009 -0.002 0.137 
ERROR Q3 124 0.240 0.181 0.204 BIAS Q3 -0.053 -0.008 0.157 
ERROR Q4 121 0.269 0.209 0.208 BIAS Q4 -0.039 -0.008 0.173 
ERROR Pooled 464 0.230 0.174 0.194 BIAS Pooled -0.031 -0.005 0.148 
Notes: Forecasts are sourced from 1760 quarterly cash flow reports issued by 481 firms during the 2005/2006 fiscal year.  ERROR is a 
measure of cash expenditure forecast accuracy and is measured as the absolute value of forecasted cash outflows less actual reported 
cash outflows for the respective quarter (Q1-4) deflated by the absolute value of the actual outflows in Panel A and deflated by lagged 
total assets in Panel B. BIAS is a measure of cash expenditure forecast bias and is measured as the signed ERROR or relative 
directional forecast error for the respective quarter, and is calculated as forecasted cash outflows less actual reported cash outflows, 
deflated by the value of the actual outflows for the respective quarter (Q1-4) in Panel A and deflated by lagged total assets in Panel B; 
ERROR Pooled includes all quarterly ERROR observations; BIAS Pooled includes all quarterly BIAS observations. The ERROR and 
BIAS measures shown in Panel B (i.e. using the lagged asset deflators) are used in regression analysis (the variable names are shown as 
FERROR and FBIAS in the regression models).  
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TABLE 3 
Number of Cash Flow Expenditure Forecasts Classified by Percentage Error (signed) 
Panel A: Exploration and Evaluation Expenditure 
  All Firms Materials Energy 
 Signed Error (%) No. (%) of Forecasts No. (%) of Forecasts No. (%) of Forecasts 
Negative < -50.01 483 (31.55%) 361 (29.64%) 122 (58.37%) 
 -40.01 to -50 44 (2.87%) 36 (2.95%) 8 (3.83%) 
 -30.01 to -40 47 (3.07%) 40 (3.28%) 7 (3.35%) 
 -20.01 to -30 70 (4.57%) 59 (4.84%) 11 (5.26%) 
 -10.01 to -20 78 (5.09%) 62 (5.09%) 16 (7.65%) 
 -0.01 to -10 68 (4.44%) 52 (4.27%) 16 (7.65%) 
Positive 0 to 10 109 (7.12%) 93 (7.63) 16 (7.65%) 
 10.01 to 20 95 (6.20%) 76 (6.24%) 19 (9.09%) 
 20.01 to 30 110 (7.18%) 96 (7.88%) 14 (6.70%) 
 30.01 to 40 93 (6.07%) 83 (6.81%) 10 (4.78%) 
 40.01 to 50 89 (5.81%) 74 (6.07%) 15 (7.18%) 
 > 50.01 245 (16.00%) 186 (15.27%) 59 (28.23%) 
Total  1531 1218 313 
Panel B: Development Expenditure 
Negative < -50.01 107 (31.29%) 63 (30.14%) 44 (33.08%) 
 -40.01 to -50 3 (0.88%) 1 (0.48%) 2 (1.50%) 
 -30.01 to -40 5 (1.46%) 3 (1.44%) 2 (1.50%) 
 -20.01 to -30 10 (2.92%) 6 (2.87%) 4 (3.01%) 
 -10.01 to -20 10 (2.92%) 7 (3.35%) 3 (2.26%) 
 -0.01 to -10 14 (4.09%) 9 (4.31%) 5 (3.76%) 
Positive 0 to 10 12 (3.51%) 7 (3.35%) 5 (3.76%) 
 10.01 to 20 13 (3.80%) 6 (2.87%) 7 (5.26%) 
 20.01 to 30 14 (4.09%) 9 (4.31%) 5 (3.76%) 
 30.01 to 40 11 (3.22%) 4 (1.91%) 7 (5.26%) 
 40.01 to 50 16 (4.68%) 11 (5.26%) 5 (3.76%) 
 > 50.01 126 (36.84%) 82 (39.23%) 44 (33.08%) 
Total  342 209 133 
Notes: Forecasts are sourced from 1760 quarterly cash flow reports issued by 481 firms during the 2005/2006 fiscal year.  
Signed Error (or bias) is measured as the difference between forecasted cash outflows and the actual reported cash outflows, 
deflated by the value of the actual outflows. 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics – Independent Variables 
       
Panel A: Test variables - continuous n Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum 
       
Total assets ($million) 479 14.503 7.029 28.087 0.18 326.12 
Total assets (logged) SIZE) 479 8.902 8.858 1.101 5.18 12.70 
Cash flow performance (PERFORM) 463 -0.116 -0.081 0.126 -0.50 0.13 
Financial slack (FINSLACK) 463 0.526 0.374 0.507 -0.03 2.00 
Cash flow volatility (CFVOL) 448 -3.118 -3.215 1.158 -6.73 5.073 
Age in years (AGE) 481 8.590 4.740 9.069 0.000 38.05 
       
Panel B: Test variable - dichotomous            
  Frequencies 
  0  1 
  n %  n  % 
Leverage dummy (LEVDUM) 448 302 67.41  146 32.59 
Experience dummy (AGEEXP) 422 353 83.65  69 16.35 
       
Panel C: Control variable - dichotomous n            
  Frequencies 
  0  1 
  n %  n  % 
Industry dummy (INDDUM) 481 371 77.13  110 22.87 
       
              
Notes:  Data are sourced from annual results for the population of 481 explorers for 2005/2006 fiscal year. In Panel A, SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of average total assets for the current fiscal year (t) and prior year (t-1); PERFORM is net operating cash flow 
deflated by average total assets for t and t-1; FINSLACK is total cash at end of quarter deflated by average total assets; CFVOL is the 
standard deviation of net operating cash flows over four prior quarters deflated by lagged total assets; and AGE is the number of 
years between listing and the current quarterly reporting date; deflated by lagged total assets. In Panel B, LEVDUM is equal to one if 
the company has financial leverage (interest-bearing debt) and zero otherwise; and AGEEXP is equal to one if the company has both 
actual exploration/evaluation and development expenditure in the same quarter, and zero otherwise. In Panel C; INDDUM is equal to 
one if the company is in the energy sector and zero if it is in the materials sector. 
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TABLE 5 
Cash Flow Forecast Accuracy and Bias - Exploration and Evaluation Expenditure 
Model 1: FERRORit = β1 + β2PERFORMit + β3 FINSLACKit + β4CFVOLit + β5LEVDUMit + β6AGEit + β7AGEEXPit + β8SIZEit + β9INDDUMit +εit 
Model 2: FBIASit = β1 + β2PERFORMit + β3 FINSLACKit + β4CFVOLit + β5LEVDUMit + β6AGEit + β7AGEEXPit + β8SIZEit + β9INDDUMit +εit 
                 
Variables Predicted Sign Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Pooled 
  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. z-stat.  
Panel A: Cash flow forecast error (Model 1) 
Intercept  0.084 1.587  0.239 4.148 *** 0.386 6.730 *** 0.309 5.284 *** 0.294 6.43 *** 
PERFORM - -0.456 -7.913 *** -0.340 -6.065 *** -0.319 -5.995 *** -0.377 -7.562 *** -0.344 -7.86 *** 
FINSLACK + 0.032 2.425 ** 0.032 2.624 *** 0.034 2.658 *** 0.051 4.646 *** 0.041 4.55 *** 
CFVOL + 0.009 1.878 ** 0.023 3.884 *** 0.029 5.012 *** 0.019 3.053 *** 0.020 3.67 *** 
LEVDUM - -0.022 -1.946 * -0.015 -1.243  -0.011 -0.880  -0.016 -1.247  -0.016 -1.99 ** 
AGE - 0.000 -0.295  0.000 -0.219  0.000 -0.661  0.000 -0.614  -0.000 -0.76  
AGEEXP - -0.031 -2.039 ** -0.065 -4.057 *** -0.032 -2.016 ** -0.062 -3.648 *** -0.039 -3.91 *** 
SIZE - 0.007 1.234  -0.005 -0.794  -0.018 -2.944 *** -0.014 -2.271 ** -0.012 -2.42 ** 
INDDUM + 0.013 1.045  0.029 2.189 ** 0.052 3.803 *** 0.036 2.611 *** 0.035 3.16 *** 
n  341   366   390   396   1493   
Adjusted R2/F-stat 0.278 17.669 *** 0.359 26.606 *** 0.389 31.946 *** 0.424 37.593 *** 0.379 291.73 *** 
                 
Panel B: Cash flow forecast bias (Model 2) 
Intercept  -0.085 -2.473 ** -0.108 -2.563 ** -0.095 -2.020 ** 0.015 0.297  -0.098 -2.29 ** 
PERFORM ? -0.221 -5.903 *** -0.350 -8.586 *** -0.203 -4.655 *** -0.071 -1.635  -0.227 -5.95 *** 
FINSLACK ? -0.010 -1.127  -0.038 -4.227 *** -0.037 -3.550 *** -0.028 -2.965 *** -0.030 -3.94 *** 
CFVOL ? 0.005 1.452  -0.009 -2.116 ** 0.004 0.790  0.012 2.279 ** 0.002 0.42  
LEVDUM ? -0.014 -1.835 * -0.013 -1.480  -0.002 -0.148  0.005 0.449  -0.005 -0.82  
AGE ? 0.000 0.562  0.000 0.471  0.000 -0.155  0.000 0.473  0.000 0.25  
AGEEXP ? -0.011 -1.160  -0.017 -1.415  -0.026 -1.997 ** -0.037 -2.525 ** -0.024 -3.53 *** 
SIZE ? 0.010 2.887 *** 0.008 1.782 * 0.011 2.252 ** 0.003 0.627  0.011 2.42 ** 
INDDUM ? -0.019 -2.352 ** -0.013 -1.302  -0.001 -0.074  -0.011 -0.929  -0.008 -0.90  
n  341   366   390   396   1493   
Adjusted R2/F-stat 0.122 7.007 *** 0.179 10.958 *** 0.064 4.350 *** 0.034 2.732 *** 0.083 63.55 *** 
                 
Notes: *, **, *** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient sign is predicted, two-tailed when coefficient sign is not predicted), respectively.  
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TABLE 6 
Cash Flow Forecast Accuracy and Bias – Development Expenditure 
                 
Model 1:      FERRORit = β1 + β2PERFORMit + β3 FINSLACKit + β4CFVOLit + β5LEVDUMit + β6AGEit + β7SIZEit + β8INDDUMit + εit  
Model 2:     FBIASit = β1 + β2PERFORMit + β3 FINSLACKit + β4CFVOLit + β5LEVDUMit + β6AGEit + β7SIZEit + β8INDDUMit + εit   
                 
Variables Predicted Sign Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Pooled  
    Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. t-stat.   Coeff. z-stat.   
Panel A: Cash flow forecast error (Model 1) 
Intercept  0.006 0.039  -0.244 -1.557  0.017 0.101  -0.036 -0.214  0.149 1.54  
PERFORM - -0.488 -3.049 *** -0.851 -5.886 *** -0.263 -1.609  -0.460 -3.053 *** -0.451 -5.28 *** 
FINSLACK + 0.197 5.283 *** 0.015 0.459  0.094 2.407 *** 0.115 3.456 *** 0.101 4.58 *** 
CFVOL + 0.006 0.426  0.021 1.382 * 0.043 2.480 *** 0.003 0.153  0.029 2.24 ** 
LEVDUM - 0.000 -0.013  -0.028 -0.875  -0.001 -0.029  0.011 0.281  0.013 0.60  
AGE - -0.001 -0.417  -0.001 -0.653  0.000 0.198  0.000 0.110  -0.000 -0.12  
SIZE - 0.007 0.504  0.047 3.235 *** 0.030 1.719 ** 0.019 1.099  0.007 0.63  
INDDUM + 0.037 1.077  -0.032 -0.918  0.010 0.235  0.013 0.304  -0.009 -0.40  
n  96   104   120   116   436   
Adjusted R2/F-stat 0.363 9.135 *** 0.375 9.825 *** 0.169 4.459 *** 0.219 5.605 *** 0.168 5.235 *** 
                 
Panel B: Cash flow forecast bias (Model 2)   
Intercept  0.027 0.265  -0.069 -0.539  -0.018 -0.131  -0.025 -0.164  -0.139 -1.26  
PERFORM ? -0.256 -2.214 ** -0.488 -3.781 *** -0.189 -1.406  -0.310 -2.331 ** -0.296 -3.20 *** 
FINSLACK ? -0.125 -4.640 *** -0.078 -2.725 *** -0.096 -2.999 *** -0.101 -3.433 *** -0.064 -3.30 *** 
CFVOL ? 0.015 1.496  -0.005 -0.365  -0.023 -1.591  0.019 1.185  -0.011 -1.12  
LEVDUM ? -0.032 -1.389  0.012 0.408  0.010 -0.328  -0.036 -1.049  -0.005 -0.29  
AGE ? 0.000 -0.063  0.001 0.553  -0.001 -0.486  0.001 0.382  0.000 0.48  
SIZE ? 0.005 0.453  0.000 0.019  -0.007 -0.508  0.006 0.411  0.005 0.46  
INDDUM ? -0.006 -0.238  0.045 1.460  0.012 0.349  0.071 1.917 * 0.033 1.66  
n  96   104   120   116   436   
Adjusted R2/F-stat 0.163 3.785 *** 0.143 3.457 *** 0.060 2.092 ** 0.123 3.302 *** 0.099 26.34 *** 
                                  
Notes: *, **, *** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient sign is predicted, two-tailed when coefficient sign is not predicted), respectively.
 
